Question:
Did JFK make a secret quid pro quo deal with Russia,
as depicted in movie Thirteen Days, to withdraw US Jupiter
missiles in Turkey in exchange for Russia's withdrawing
its missiles in Cuba?
Issue:
What was actually promised at Anatoly F. Dobrynin's
Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy on 27 October 1962?
Circumstances:
1) The Kennedys maintained that neither John nor Robert
Kennedy promised to withdraw the Jupiters as a quid
pro quo, or concession, in exchange for the removal
of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. Instead, they asserted
we went eyeball to eyeball with the Russians and they
blinked. In the first public admission the issue of
a quid pro quo was discussed. Robert F. Kennedy's Thirteen
Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, depicts
RFK as rejecting any firm agreement to withdraw the
Jupiters. So if such a quid pro quo deal happened, the
Kennedys would have intentionally provided a false history
of the event.
2) The deployment of missile bases in Turkey was done
by a special decision of the NATO Council. A unilateral
decision by the president of the USA to withdraw them
would be in violation of the NATO treaty. Since the
Supreme Court held that treaties are the law of the
land, a violation of a NATO treaty could be construed
as a violation of the law.
What Happened?
My view. Best Information is that Thirteen
Days was accurate: JFK made a quid pro quo (See Below).
Dobrynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 27
October 1962:
TOP SECRET Making Copies Prohibited Copy No. 1
CIPHERED TELEGRAM
Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come see him.
We talked alone. The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began,
continues to quickly worsen....
"And what about Turkey?" I asked R. Kennedy. "If that
is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I mentioned
earlier, then the president doesn't see any unsurmountable
difficulties in resolving this issue," replied R. Kennedy.
"The greatest difficulty for the president is the public
discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the deployment
of missile bases in Turkey was done by a special decision
of the NATO Council. To announce now a unilateral decision
by the president of the USA to withdraw missile bases
from Turkey--this would damage the entire structure
of NATO and the US position as the leader of NATO, where,
as the Soviet government knows very well, there are
many arguments. In short, if such a decision were announced
now it would seriously tear apart NATO." "However, President
Kennedy is ready to come to agree on that question with
N.S. Khrushchev, too. I think that in order to withdraw
these bases from Turkey," R. Kennedy said, "we need
4-5 months. This is the minimal amount of time necessary
for the US government to do this, taking into account
the procedures that exist within the NATO framework.
On the whole Turkey issue," R. Kennedy added, "if Premier
N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I've said, we can continue
to exchange opinions between him and the president,
using him, R. Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. "However,
the president can't say anything public in this regard
about Turkey," R. Kennedy said again. R. Kennedy then
warned that his comments about Turkey are extremely
confidential; besides him and his brother, only 2-3
people know about it in Washington. "That's all that
he asked me to pass on to N.S. Khrushchev," R. Kennedy
said in conclusion. "The president also asked N.S. Khrushchev
to give him an answer (through the Soviet ambassador
and R. Kennedy) if possible within the next day 27/X-62.
A. DOBRYNIN
[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, translation
from copy provided by NHK, in Richard Ned Lebow and
Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War.
Sorensen's "Confession:"
...the president [Kennedy] recognized that, for Chairman
Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, it would
be undoubtedly helpful to him if he could say at the
same time to his colleagues on the Presidium, "And we
have been assured that the missiles will be coming out
of Turkey." And so, after the ExComm meeting [on the
evening of 27 October 1962], as I'm sure almost all
of you know, a small group met in President Kennedy's
office, and he instructed Robert Kennedy--at the suggestion
of Secretary of State [Dean] Rusk--to deliver the letter
to Ambassador Dobrynin for referral to Chairman Khrushchev,
but to add orally what was not in the letter: that the
missiles would come out of Turkey. Ambassador Dobrynin
felt that Robert Kennedy's book did not adequately express
that the "deal" on the Turkish missiles was part of
the resolution of the crisis. And here I have a confession
to make to my colleagues on the American side, as well
as to others who are present. I was the editor of Robert
Kennedy's book. It was, in fact, a diary of those thirteen
days. And his diary was very explicit that this was
part of the deal; but at that time it was still a secret
even on the American side, except for the six of us
who had been present at that meeting. So I took it upon
myself to edit that out of his diaries, and that is
why the Ambassador is somewhat justified in saying that
the diaries are not as explicit as his conversation.
[Sorensen comments, in Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight,
and David A. Welch, eds., Back to the Brink: Proceedings
of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis,
January 27-28, 1989pp. 92-93]
Accounts of Former U.S. Officials: McGeorge Bundy:
... Later [on Saturday], accepting a proposal from
Dean Rusk, [John F.] Kennedy instructed his brother
to tell Ambassador Dobrynin that while there could be
no bargain over the missiles that had been supplied
to Turkey, the president himself was determined to have
them removed and would attend to the matter once the
present crisis was resolved--as long as no one in Moscow
called that action part of a bargain. [p. 406] ...The
other part of the oral message [to Dobrynin] was proposed
by Dean Rusk; that we should tell Khrushchev that while
there could be no deal over the Turkish missiles, the
president was determined to get them out and would do
so once the Cuban crisis was resolved. The proposal
was quickly supported by the rest of us [in addition
to Bundy and Rusk, those present included President
Kennedy, McNamara, RFK, George Ball, Roswell Gilpatrick,
Llewellyn Thompson, and Theodore Sorensen]. Concerned
as we all were by the cost of a public bargain struck
under pressure at the apparent expense of the Turks,
and aware as we were from the day's discussion that
for some, even in our own closest councils, even this
unilateral private assurance might appear to betray
an ally, we agreed without hesitation that no one not
in the room was to be informed of this additional message.
Robert Kennedy was instructed to make it plain to Dobrynin
that the same secrecy must be observed on the other
side, and that any Soviet reference to our assurance
would simply make it null and void. [pp. 432-44] ...There
was no leak. As far as I know, none of the nine of us
told anyone else what had happened. We denied in every
forum that there was any deal, and in the narrowest
sense what we said was usually true, as far as it went.
When the orders were passed that the Jupiters must come
out, we gave the plausible and accurate--if incomplete--explanation
that the missile crisis had convinced the president
once and for all that he did not want those missiles
there....
[p. 434] [from McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival:
Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New
York: Random House, 1988]
It appears RFK may have also misinformed Secretary
of State Rusk:
Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandum for Dean Rusk on Meeting
with Anatoly F. Dobrynin on 27 October 1962 TOP SECRET
Office of the Attorney General Washington, D.C. October
30, 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL At the request of Secretary Rusk,
I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at approximately 7:15
p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would
come to the Justice Department at a quarter of eight.
We met in my office. I told him first that we understood
that the work was continuing on the Soviet missile bases
in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last
two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba
had been fired upon and that one of our U-2's had been
shot down and the pilot killed. I said these men were
flying unarmed planes. I told him that this was an extremely
serious turn in events. We would have to make certain
decisions within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. There
was a very little time left. If the Cubans were shooting
at our planes, then we were going to shoot back. This
could not help but bring on further incidents and that
he had better understand the full implications of this
matter. He raised the point that the argument the Cubans
were making was that we were violating Cuban air space.
I replied that if we had not been violating Cuban air
space then we would still be believing what he and Khrushchev
had said--that there were no long-range missiles in
Cuba. In any case I said that this matter was far more
serious than the air space over Cuba and involved peoples
all over the world. I said that he had better understand
the situation and he had better communicate that understanding
to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled
us. The Soviet Union had secretly established missile
bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming, privately
and publicly, that this would never be done. I said
those missile bases had to go and they had to go right
away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow
that those bases would be removed. This was not an ultimatum,
I said, but just a statement of fact. He should understand
that if they did not remove those bases then we would
remove them. His country might take retaliatory actions
but he should understand that before this was over,
while there might be dead Americans there would also
be dead Russians. He then asked me what offer we were
making. I said a letter had just been transmitted to
the Soviet Embassy which stated in substance that the
missile bases should be dismantled and all offensive
weapons should be removed from Cuba. In return, if Cuba
and Castro and the Communists ended their subversive
activities in other Central and Latin-American countries,
we would agree to keep peace in the Caribbean and not
permit an invasion from American soil. He then asked
me about Khrushchev's other proposal dealing with the
removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that
there could be no quid pro quo -- no deal of this kind
could be made. This was a matter that had to be considered
by NATO and that it was up to NATO to make the decision.
I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take
such a step under the present threatening position of
the Soviet Union. If some time elapsed -- and per your
instructions, I mentioned four or five months -- I said
I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactorily.
[crossed out by hand--ed.] Per your instructions I repeated
that there could be no deal of any kind and that any
steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world
largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev
taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately. I repeated
to him that this matter could not wait and that he had
better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment
from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases
under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said,
there would be drastic consequences. RFK: amn.
[Source: John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; provided
to CWIHP by Prof. Peter Roman, Duquesne University,
Pittsburgh, PA.]
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